

Hierarchy and structure in academic and romantic markets

prestige, diversity & inequality

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faculty shape the academic ecosystem

- make discoveries [science & scholarship]
- teach courses [education]
- train students [research ecosystem & workforce]
- communicate science [media & public]
- advocate for research priorities [policy]

questions

1. **faculty production**: where do U.S. faculty come from, and are doctoral origins changing?
2. **placement and prestige**: does doctoral institution affect employment? is hiring hierarchical?
3. **representation of women**: is academia heading towards gender parity?


ten years of comprehensive faculty data

- complete **tenure-track faculty rosters**
- **10 years** (2011-2020) of rosters, collected annually
- **all PhD-granting US universities**
- all departments, clustered into **107 fields** and **8 domains**
- each professor's PhD* institution & year


in total: **295,089 faculty** in **10,612 departments** at **368 universities**.




where do U.S.-trained faculty come from?




Where do U.S.-trained faculty come from?



where do U.S.-trained faculty come from?




did inequalities change from 2011-2020?



G are all large across domains.

they do not appear to be growing or shrinking over the decade 2011-2020.




did inequalities change from 2011-2020?



in every field, domain, and overall, faculty production inequality is lower for new faculty, and higher for sitting faculty!

what might explain these patterns?

driver: differential attrition risk by PhD origin




this means that there's **substantial inequality in faculty hiring** and that this inequality is then **exacerbated by attrition**.

faculty with the "rarest" PhDs show **nearly 2x the attrition rates** of their colleagues with the most common PhDs.

this process makes cohorts less diverse by doctoral origin as they age.

faculty hiring networks



premises:

1. each hiring committee wants to hire the best.
2. each hire $u \rightarrow v$ is an endorsement of u by v .
3. network reveals collective mutual endorsements.

a recursive notion of prestige:

one becomes prestigious when one is endorsed by someone prestigious.



infer prestige scores directly from the structural patterns in faculty hiring networks.
[SpringRank — cf. RUMs & Discrete Choice]



convert prestige scores to ranks/percentiles.

faculty hiring networks



low upward mobility

- 5%↑ Classics
- 6%↑ Econ, Finance
- 7%↑ Art History, Stats
- ⋮
- 12%↑ CS, Epidemiology
- ⋮
- 18%↑ Academia
- 20%↑ Horticulture
- 21%↑ Agronomy, Entomology
- 23%↑ Animal Sci, Pathology


average hire moves down by

- ↓28% Econ
- ↓22% CS
- ↓18% Academia
- ↓14% Agronomy

of each field-specific prestige ranking



women's representation in the academy




from 2011-2020:

women's representation **significantly increased** in academia overall, all 8 domains, and 80/107 fields.


it decreased in only 1 field (nursing).

women's representation in the academy



women's representation is systematically **higher among new hires** and **lower among attritions** in 103/107 fields.




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
demographic curves show why: representation slides downward for cohorts hired in the past.

women's representation in the academy



women's representation **among new faculty** increased from 2011-2020 overall, in 3/8 domains, and in 15/107 fields (14%)


women's representation in the academy



new hires remain predominantly men
in 75 of 107 fields, particularly in STEM

women's representation **among new faculty**
increased from 2011-2020 overall, in 3/8
domains, and in 15/107 fields (14%)

without continued efforts toward parity in hiring, the changes in women's overall representation from 2011-2020 will soon plateau in many domains.





new hires remain predominantly men in 75 of 107 fields, particularly in STEM

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summary

1. **faculty production**: a minority of institutions produce the majority of U.S. faculty; attrition exacerbates these inequalities.
2. **placement and prestige**: hiring follows a steep hierarchy at all levels of academia; most faculty work at an institution that is less prestigious than where they earned their doctorate
3. **representation of women**: the share of women in academia is increasing, but slowly and unevenly; without further intervention, progress is likely to stall in most STEM fields

explore: Larremore Lab.github.io/us-faculty



how has dating been studied?

social scientists have long been interested in

- who partners with whom
- why people enter/stay in partnerships
- how current patterns in partnering affect those in the future

the theoretical foundation for most of these studies is

the idea that [mate pursuit unfolds in a market](#):

"since men and women compete as they seek mates, a market in marriages can be presumed to exist. Each person tries to find the best mate, subject to the restrictions imposed by market conditions."

[Gary Becker, "A Theory of Marriage" 1974](#)


how do market conditions impose restrictions?

you can't "just choose" to partner with the person you like best they might have other **suitors**, or different **preferences**.

you can only partner with the person you want if they prefer you over all of their other suitors — only if you **successfully beat out the competition**.

a suitor can only **partner** after **succeeding** in one of the **competitions** that result from their **preferences** and **opportunities**

assortative mating results from competition



*there is a rich game-theoretic literature on marriage markets that captures how competition shapes outcomes, but no empirical studies that I know of have looked at competition in relationship markets.

why hasn't competition been studied?

lack of data: studying competition requires information on everyone in a romantic market and all overtures they made. Such data are only recently available on a large scale (i.e., through online dating).

lack of methodology: competition isn't directly observable in the data from online dating sites (i.e., who pursues whom). Studying it requires a method of transforming those data into games that reveals the competitions.


today I'll present a framework for studying competition and apply it to an online dating market in New York City

questions

1. **competition & popularity**: are the most competitive people on the dating site also the most popular?
2. **who competes with whom**: do suitors who pursue similar partners also compete with people who look like them?
3. **competition stiffness & selectivity**: which demographic groups face the "stiffest" competitions (i.e., has the most competitors) and why?

data from popular, free dating site

- straight singles, 18-65, in New York Metro Area, active on dating site between January - March 2014
- 40.7k men and 36.5k women looking for romantic union
- 76% white, 82% college educated, average age = 33



messaging data

- who contacts whom
- who replies to whom



profile data

- user demographics (race, age, education)

from **messages** to games to competitiveness

messaging data

first message	got reply?
x→a	yes
y→a	no
z→a	no
x→b	no
y→b	no
v→b	yes
w→b	yes
y→c	yes
z→c	no

messaging data have been used to study mate preferences & construct desirability rankings*

heterosexual messaging data connect men to women & women to men...


...but what if we looked at messaging data in the way people study tournaments and games?

from messages to **games** to competitiveness

messaging data

first message	got reply?
x→a	yes
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games



a suitor **wins** when an arbiter replies to them, but not to someone else

they **lose** when an arbiter replies to someone else, but not to them

when a suitor **makes an overture** to an arbiter, they **enter a game**


the arbiter's decision to ignore or reply determines **the suitor's outcome** in the game

from messages to games to competitiveness


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games



win:loss graph



a suitor **wins** when an arbiter replies to them, but not to someone else

they **lose** when an arbiter replies to someone else, but not to them

a suitor with a **high** win:loss ratio is **competitive**

competition through the lens of race



- plays outsized role in shaping people's partner choices, overriding factors such as education
- is the primary focus of previous research on partner preferences, especially those using online dating data*
- is one of the few remaining areas where people openly express racial preferences

note: I'll be using words like "desired, popular, attractive" in their literal sense to make statements about the data and patterns therein — **not** to pass judgements, or make generalizations, or as any kind of assertion about worth/value.


Q1: are the most competitive suitors
also the most popular?

A1: not really.

competitiveness \neq popularity




popularity is consistent with previous findings about preference hierarchies.




see: Ken-Hou Lin and Jennifer Lundquist. Mate selection in cyberspace: The intersection of race, gender, and education.

do popularity and win:loss *agree*?




do popularity and win:loss *agree*?
for **white** suitors, **yes**




they win and lose in proportion to their popularity.

do popularity and win:loss *agree*?
for non-white men and women, **no**



non-white men and **black** women are *more competitive* than popular
asian and **latina** women are *less competitive* than popular

what's going on here?



lesson: friendship has benefits


competitiveness isn't about attractiveness. it doesn't matter how attractive everyone else thinks you are when you pursue people who disagree.

competitiveness is about getting replies. suitors are most likely to receive replies from arbiters of the same race, so the more often a suitor pursues arbiters of the same race, the more competitive they will typically be.


Q2: who competes with whom?

homophily dominates preferences

FEMALE SENDING PATTERN




MALE SENDING PATTERN



might lead us to expect that suitors mostly compete with members of their own race

darker = more likely to pursue


but everyone mostly competes with white competitors...



how is this possible? follow the messages.

let's focus on **asian men**,
who have a strong
preference for **asian women**.

asian men's outboxes




asian men send 48% of their overtures to white women (.6x random)

... and 46% of their overtures to asian women, who make up 8% of women (5.6x random)

low probability of writing
X
large population at risk of
being written to
=
large inflow of messages

women's inboxes



asian men make up only 6% of men on site,
so their overtures make up a relatively small fraction
of even asian women's inboxes.


asian men's competition

asian men make up only 18% of asian men's competition

white men make up fully a third of asian men's competition


asian men's outboxes

women's inboxes



we call this *preference dilution*

preferences that affect pursuit are diluted in competition



both positive and negative preferences are diluted.

lesson: preference dilution

homophilous messaging doesn't necessarily lead to homophilous competition when the majority of the population comes from one demographic.

we can't understand segregation patterns by only looking at preferences due to this dilution effect.


Q3: who faces the stiffest competitions?



when a suitor pursues an arbiter, the stiffness of that competition is the count of other suitors in pursuit.


the more desirable the arbiter, the stiffer the competition.

suitors who enter stiffer competitions are more selective




Strange. Wouldn't we expect most competitive suitors to be in biggest competitions?

selectivity depends on who you are pursuing



relative selectivity = stiffness when you pursue arbiters of some race - stiffness when others do


suitors are **least** selective when pursuing their own race



there is a *homophily bonus*


suitors are often **more** selective when pursuing other races

asian and latino men are more selective than other men when pursuing white women




there is a *heterogeny tax*

suitors are often **more** selective when pursuing other races



non-white suitors are most selective when pursuing **white** arbiters

suitors are often **more** selective when pursuing other races



white suitors apply a **heterogeneity tax** when pursuing non-white arbiters

lesson: social distance is costly

homophily bonus: people evaluate partners who are socially close to them more generously than others do.

heterogeny tax: people evaluate partners who are socially distant from them less generously than others do.

The greater the social distance between suitor and arbiter, the more attractive an arbiter must be for the suitor to pursue them.

The higher the cost of overcoming social boundaries, the higher the suitor's standards.

beyond status exchange

old idea: people less desirable in one attribute "compensate" with another

e.g., old *but* rich men pursue beautiful *but* poor women

new idea: social distance imposes a cost *regardless of suitors' own attractiveness*

e.g., black women pursue white men only if they are attractive *and* educated

summary

1. **competition & popularity**: suitors don't need to be desirable to be competitive, as long as they pursue arbiters who are likely to reply
2. **who competes with whom**: preferences have a large impact on who suitors pursue, but a diluted affect on their competition; everyone is most likely to compete with white suitors
3. **competition stiffness & selectivity**: suitors are less selective than their peers when pursuing arbiters of their own race, and they are typically more selective than their peers when pursuing arbiters of other races

reflections and future work

- my work on academic markets used *placement* data
- my work on romantic markets used *application* data

but we *really* want both types of data in both cases,
because then we could ask...


in the academic market:

- do men and women *apply* similarly?
- do their applications *succeed* at similar rates?
- are there *field-* or *institution-level* variations?

in romantic markets:

- does homophily *increase* as pursuit proceeds?
- do *market experiences* (like desirability or competitiveness) affect *partnership outcomes*?

Thank you to these fantastic people




Dan Larremore



Aaron Clauset



Elizabeth Bruch



Sam Zhang



Nick LaBerge



Ian van Buskirk



Katie Spoon



Allison Morgan



Sam F Way



everyone in the
Larremore and
Clauset labs

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